

Comparing the motivation of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan

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Foreword

With increasing challenges for governments around the globe, the vital role of a well-functioning civil service grows ever more important. We are certain that a merit-based, effective and efficient civil service will become a nation's most important competitive advantage in the 21st century. Moreover, the importance of civil service in achieving the goals of global development agenda has long been recognized.

Undoubtedly, overall quality of civil service depends, among other factors, on the level of motivation, morale and commitment of public servants to their jobs. Consequently, a lot of attention is paid to the concept of Public Service Motivation (PSM) nowadays.

In this regard, it is not accidental that the idea of New Public Passion (NPP) has emerged drawing lessons from PSM by linking intrinsic motivation to serve the public interest with organisational dynamism. At the heart of NPP is a critical principle denoting that a motivated workforce is needed in order to achieve the objectives of governments' development policies, programmes and strategies, as well as in creating high-performance organisations. Besides, a strong motivation in the public service is also essential to achieve the SDG targets.

However, most of the research on Public Service Motivation has been carried out in the context of developed countries. It is only in recent years that we see a growing interest in motivation studies in emerging economies. For this reason, it was decided to go forward with this work – an initiative of the Astana Civil Service Hub, UNDP in Pakistan and UNDP Global Center for Public Service Excellence in Singapore.

This research is one of the first steps in the region to study the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of civil servants. We sincerely hope that this study will contribute to better tailor reform interventions within the civil service in the areas of human resources management, training and capacity building, and that policymakers and practitioners will benefit from the ideas elaborated in this work to arrive to more informed decisions.

**Alikhan Baimenov,
Chairman of the Steering Committee
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of our comparative study into the motivational profile of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan; two geographical, cultural and institutional settings in Asia that have never before been studied in the context of public service motivation (PSM). Interest in PSM that refers to the disposition of individuals to respond to motives grounded primarily in public sector organizations has seen significant growth in the past decade. More recently, interest has increased in the prospects of PSM in non-Western, developing contexts with their own unique challenges for keeping public officials motivated and for attracting, retaining, and nurturing capable and motivated employees.

South Asian Pakistan is a developing governance setting characterised by path dependence of its colonial past, a complex political history, and subsequent externally enforced reforms. Central Asian Kazakhstan has a Soviet heritage and has experienced similar reforms pressures while its strong post-Soviet leadership has created overall political stability and growth. In developmental settings such as these, public sector jobs may often be more about stable and secure employment, fulfilling basic needs, prestige, and family tradition, than about self-development and “advancing the public cause”. On the other hand, a strong sense of PSM and intrinsic motivation may be a sheer necessity to continue to perform and serve well in such settings in the first place. Therefore, to further elucidate the motivational profile of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, and their attitudes towards their job, organization, and working environment, we examined the prevalence of various types of motivations in combination with measuring extrinsic motivations, job satisfaction, person-organization fit and organizational culture.

The results of the study provide four key insights into the motivational profile and workplace attitudes of public servants in Pakistan (n=208) and Kazakhstan (n=740).

1. The public servants in Pakistan we surveyed score significantly higher on PSM than their counterparts in Kazakhstan, but this difference disappears when we compare only the public servants operating at the national level (local public servants in Pakistan score highest on PSM). On the other hand, the Kazakh public servants in our study score significantly higher on extrinsic motivation. Public servants in both countries consider primary and secondary benefits to be important for their motivation and performance, while they also value the need for fairer working conditions and more individually tailored performance, training, and development schemes.
2. Public servants in Pakistan display positive attitudes towards creating public value and our study suggests that their existing commitment to upholding public interests can be further leveraged by creating a positive and engaging working environment. In Kazakhstan, the collegiality and ‘family’ culture in the workplace are emphasized. In both cases, however, public servants are critical towards management and the way in which their work is structured and organized (managers may often be the ‘messengers’ here as there may be larger political (reform) forces at work that affect how work is structured and organized). More autonomy and horizontal coordination may enhance motivation and performance in these organizational environments, in which colleagues are sometimes more trusted and respected than superiors (and more top-down management may result in the exact opposite).
3. The fact that many participants emphasized the importance of training for motivation and increasing public service effectiveness, demonstrates that there is a desire to learn new things, which aligns with one of their key motivations to join the public service in the first place. This desire may need to be further leveraged to raise the overall quality of the public service and keep the workforce motivated.
4. The perception of public servants in both countries that promotions are not merit-based needs to be addressed to sustain long-term motivation and ensure an inflow of talented graduates into the public sector. Evidence from successful countries in this regard, such as Singapore and New Zealand, shows that *performance leadership* is at least as important as simply importing ‘paper’ performance schemes from other settings that are not enforced in practice.

The results of the study show how various motivational measures and methods, supplemented with (tailored) questions about performance, job satisfaction, and organizational culture can provide us with a rounded picture of the main reasons for joining and staying in the public service in non-Western, developing country contexts. The motivational profiles of the public servants in this study reflect a balanced mix of both intrinsic and more extrinsic, classical bureaucratic drivers (such as a “stable and secure future”). Moreover, the results show how crucial organizational culture and climate are for public servants to continue putting in the effort and performing

in challenging institutional contexts with imperfect training and performance regimes. Our results signify the need for expanding a comparative research agenda on the motivation of public servants in developing settings, as well as development of new research constructs and methods that take into account both aspirational and materialistic aspects of public service behaviours.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Aim of this study

The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive, empirical picture of the motivational profile of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan. This is the first study of its kind in Pakistan. With this research, we can meaningfully add to the current knowledge base on motivation of public officials, more generally known as public service motivation or PSM. However, supplementing and complementing current PSM research that emphasizes altruistic and idealistic motives for pursuing public sector employment is paramount to study motivation of public sector workers in developing political economies. Directly transferring models and approaches developed in stable and prosperous, mostly Western contexts to governance settings of a completely different nature seldom leads to fruitful or useful (research) outcomes and is potentially dangerous and harmful, as many studies into public management reform have shown.

Indeed, in contexts where public sector jobs are often more about survival and providing basic needs than about self-development and “advancing the public cause”, such public service motivation measures need to be supplemented with public sector motivation measures and insights from Self-Determination Theory, as to also include extrinsic motivations (job security, pension systems, social status, additional earning potential, and work-life balance). By studying a range of drivers and incentives¹.

In addition, this study examines more generally the attitudes of public servants in Pakistan towards their career, the culture and climate of their working environment, and identifies what they see as the biggest constraints and most effective reform instruments to enhance motivation and performance. Indeed, motivation in public sectors matters, not for its own sake, but because highly motivated administrators may be capable of pushing through seemingly unattainable reforms, and change organizational cultures in the necessary direction, and have immense effects on civic trust and self-confidence of capacities of the citizenry (the relationship between politician, bureaucrat, and citizen is a critical factor in developing contexts). Without such drivers being present in the often-powerful bureaucracy and its key interest groups (from whom it may have to detach itself), developing countries may never find the right path to development despite massive efforts from the international community, including UNDP.

2.2 Scope and key questions

Research into motivation, job satisfaction, and person-organization-fit has a long tradition in disciplines such as Organizational Psychology and Sociology. The specific interest in PSM that has emerged within Public Administration and Public Management is of a more recent nature, starting in the 1990s and accelerating in the last decade.² The report concentrates on this particular stream of research to maintain a clear focus on public sector individuals and organizations. Within this scope, we aim to answer two sets of key questions:

1. How can we characterize the motivational profile of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, and how does this profile differ between public servants in both countries?
2. How do public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan evaluate their current working climate and culture, to what extent are they satisfied with their current working environment, and how could this environment be improved?

2.3 Approach and method

We employed a large-scale survey study containing generic items as well as country specific items to measure the variables discussed above. We conducted a review of recent literature and previous contract research for UNDP to collate internationally and scientifically validated measurement scales and items for the global part of our survey.

In addition, we conducted two focus groups with senior Pakistani and Kazakh officials to solicit relevant topics and questions for the country specific part of the study, including two open questions that produced qualitative data. The UNDP project team and the academic advisory board commented on early drafts and helped us to fine tune our instruments.

2.4. Country background

PAKISTAN

Country information

Pakistan, officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is a federal parliamentary republic in South Asia. It is the sixth-most populous country with a population exceeding 200 million people with an area covering 881,913 square kilometres. Pakistan has a 1,046-kilometre-long (650-mile) coastline along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the south and is bordered by India to the east, Afghanistan to the west, Iran to the southwest and China in the far northeast respectively.

Pakistan was created in 1947 as an independent nation, and is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country. Initially a dominion, Pakistan adopted a new constitution in 1956, becoming an Islamic republic. In 1973 Pakistan adopted a new constitution that established a Federal Government based in Islamabad alongside its pre-existing parliamentary republic status – which consists of four provinces and four federal territories. The Constitution also states that all laws are to conform with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah.

Table 1: Civil service system Pakistan: general description

| | Legal framework | HR management mechanisms | |
|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---|
| <i>Central HRM unit</i> | Federal Public Service Commission | <i>Training</i> | Common Training Program (CTP) for fresh entrants to various Central Superior Services at the Civil Service Academy Lahore |
| <i>Role</i> | Responsible for the central examination of public servants | <i>Performance management</i> | Performance evaluation report. Criteria: inputs, output, outcome, process. Methods: self-rating, peer-rating, upward feedback, “360 degrees” feedback. Evaluation by the reporting officer on knowledge, expertise, integrity, competence, analytical skills, and future prospects for training |
| <i>Legislative underpinning</i> | The Civil Servants Act of 1973 | <i>Pay</i> | Basic pay scale regularly revised according to the inflation rate. Civil servants are also entitled to other allowances, e.g. ad hoc relief allowance, medical allowance, conveyance allowance, house rent allowance etc. |
| <i>Job classification</i> | A system of 22 national pay grades known as Basic Pay Scales (BPS), covering: workers performing unskilled tasks under BPS-1-4; various categories of clerical personnel under BPS-5-15; superintendents under BPS-16; and officers under BPS-17-22. | <i>Career advancement</i> | Promotions are generally based on four criteria: minimum length of active service; an unblemished disciplinary record; the required threshold in performance evaluation reports; and successful completion of the mandatory training course |
| <i>Recruitment and dismissal</i> | Four channels of recruitment: direct recruitment (annual examination), direct induction of military officers, advertisements, ad hoc recruitment | <i>Rotation</i> | Federal employees may be posted to provinces based on the decision of the top management |
| <i>Employment conditions</i> | Contract-based | <i>Retirement</i> | Federal employees receive a special pension upon retirement |

Recent reforms

In 2016, the Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reforms Ahsan Iqbal has announced that the upper age limit would be increased up to 30 years instead of 28, for taking the Central Superior Services (CSS) examination from 2017 onwards. On January 1, 2016, the Planning Commission began phasing out the Annual Confidential Report (ACRs) with the key performance indicators (KPIs) to determine promotions of civil servants.

On August 2, 2016, the Planning Commission announced plans to re-structure the examination process by dividing the Civil Superior Services (CSS) under three cluster programme comprising three categories including General, Finance and Information by abolishing the existing generalised system. The plan would come into effect from 2018 and would require participants to possess a four-year bachelor's degree in a relevant discipline, for information cluster, a degree in mass communication, journalism or information science will be required, while for finance cluster a degree in economics, finance or related discipline will be required.

KAZAKHSTAN

Country information

Kazakhstan is the world's largest landlocked country, and the ninth largest in the world, located in Central Asia, with a land area of 2,724,900 square kilometres and a population of around 18 million people. Given its large land area, its population density is among the lowest in the world, at less than 6 people per square kilometre. Kazakhstan is the dominant economic nation of Central Asia, generating 60% of the region's GDP, primarily through its oil and gas industry. It also has vast mineral resources.

Kazakhstan is officially a democratic, secular, unitary, constitutional republic with a diverse cultural heritage. Kazakhstan shares borders with Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and also adjoins a large part of the Caspian Sea. The capital is Astana, where it was moved in 1997 from Almaty, the country's largest city.

Table 2: Civil service system Kazakhstan: general description

| | Legal framework | HR management mechanisms | |
|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|
| Central HRM unit | Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption | Training | Conversion training: within the first 6 months after appointment Professional development: every 3 years |
| Role | Civil service policy design, oversight and enforcement | Rotation | For corps A and some regional posts of corps B |
| Legislative underpinning | Law "On civil service", Presidential decrees, Government acts, executive acts of the Agency | Pay | Based on a base salary and a coefficient dependent on the job grade and civil service experience |
| Job classification | Political appointees Administrative civil servants: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corps A (top managers) • Corps B (implementers) | Career advancement | Through competitive recruitment within the government body – an interview with a selection panel |
| Recruitment and dismissal | Corps A: through a talent pool approved by a designated National commission. Corps B: internal recruitment within the government body, if no candidate – civil service-wide recruitment, if no candidate again – nation-wide recruitment. Recruitment consists of a legislation knowledge test, competency-based test, language test, and an interview with a selection panel | Performance management | Corps A: by a designated National commission. Corps B: 3 components – work input, work plan implementation, '360 degrees' feedback |
| Employment conditions | Corps A: contract of maximum 8 years Corps B: no contract | Retirement | No specific retirement schemes |

Recent reforms

The current stage of reforms can be characterised by a rather decisive effort to move away from a position-based system to a career one. The priority in the new Law “On civil service” is given to internal recruitment, first within the ministry, then among all the current civil servants, and only in the event of the absence of a suitable match will the position be advertised externally. The positive development is that the civil servants now have to participate in a formal selection process if they want to be promoted which was not the case previously. Other new measures that are currently being implemented are a point factor pay system, an update of the performance assessment system, and improvements in the professional training based on competencies.

3. EXISTING RESEARCH: MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS

3.1 What do we already know?

Public Service Motivation or PSM stipulates that public sector workers are attracted to the public sector – and driven to work hard in complex circumstances with often limited financial benefits – because they want to help others, solve public policy problems, and want to contribute to the pursuit of the public interest. PSM is most commonly defined as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions or organizations”.³ It has become one of the key areas of study in Public Administration and Public Management in recent years.

There are two reasons for the rise in popularity of PSM. First, the concept represents a clear countermovement to the overemphasis on market-based, instrumental, and efficiency-driven approaches to public management in the 1990s and early 2000s, better known as New Public Management (NPM).⁴ In this regard, UNDP (2015) has introduced the concept of New Public Passion. Second, PSM emerged as a response to cynical perceptions of rational, self-interested, and purely extrinsically motivated “bureaucrats” depicted by public choice theorists in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵

On the contrary, PSM as a concept is grounded in the belief that those who choose a career in public service do so because of a ‘fit’ with a professional and institutional environment that aims to advance public interests and the human condition, for reasons that go beyond just making a living and earning a salary. Indeed, recent overview studies into PSM across the globe have shown that public sector workers generally possess high levels of PSM (as do employees of non-profit organizations), and consistently report higher levels of PSM than private sector employees⁶, just as students of Public Policy Schools do in comparison with Business School students⁷.

International comparative studies into PSM, however, suggest that it may have limitations as a universally applicable concept capable of measuring motivation for public service in a variety of settings. Three issues in particular suggest international research (in developing contexts) needs to consider supplementing PSM with other constructs that measure the motivation of public officials.

First, motivation is different from values, attitudes and beliefs. In short, PSM does not identify the reasons for behaviours but rather values, attitudes and beliefs that may (or may not) lead to these behaviours⁸. This value-based, ‘idealistic’ nature of PSM as a concept may not always be consistent with individuals’ values and behaviours in certain circumstances.

Second, even public service behaviour that is prosocial in nature, may originate in motives which are both altruistic and egoistic⁹. Recently, scholars have suggested to merge constructs of prosocial with those of egoistic incentives to study a range of incentives and motivations that may – in various combinations depending on context, role, and the required behaviour or decision – all characterize the motivational profiles of public servants¹⁰.

Third, the paucity of current research on PSM limits understanding of how historical, cultural, governance and institutional contexts impact motivation of public officials in these specific settings (Van der Wal, 2015)¹¹. Research so far does not sufficiently address cultural and contextual differences of public services in different settings; some even suggests it suffers from the ‘aspirational bias’, meaning that by constructing measures of motivation in a certain way outcomes overly positive outcomes are produced that do not necessarily fully reflect the actual motivational profile of public servants¹².

3.2 What do we need to know?

Research on motivation for public service lacks a geographical and contextual diversity: several prominent regions of the world are either not covered or looked at selectively, with developed countries receiving more scholarly attention than their developing counterparts. PSM relying on values, implies that these are supposed to be universal across cultures as they pertain to creating social benefit. The framework of PSM, therefore, would have limited capacity to explain such motives for joining public service, as prestige, power, or the opportunity to make connections for personal gain.

Indeed, studies in non-Western contexts show that the Western PSM concept does not always directly apply; in fact, may be problematic in explaining the complete picture of public servant's motivations.¹³ The picture is often unclear due to the 'white noise' created by cultural values and societal disposition. Notable examples include Confucian values in the Korean and Chinese contexts that underscore the administrative tradition; and Egyptian culture characterised by collectivism strongly influenced by Islamic work values (Van der Wal, 2015).

Thus, to acquire meaningful data on work motivation of public officials in Pakistan – a South Asian developing democratic country with a public service rooted in the British model – and Kazakhstan – a central Asian middle-income country with a civil service rooted in the Soviet era affected by various reforms – we employ a broader approach to employee motivation than just measuring PSM. After all, understanding the specific motivational patterns of public officials in both countries is crucial to improve the effectiveness of governance as well as for UNDP to design reform interventions that yield results.

In support of this argument, it is worth noting that recent studies in Asian countries show that public officials are not driven by intrinsic factors alone.¹⁴ Arguably more so than in many Western countries, government jobs in Asia have very high societal stature¹⁵, and government work often provides better security and benefits than private sector jobs¹⁶. As such, public officials may pursue and attain government employment not just because they want to 'do good' or have compassion with their fellow citizens but also because it gives them power and status, job security, good career prospects, and direct impact on the country's policy development. Moreover, public sector employment may also command respect from family, friends, and clan.

At the same time, what UNDP and the government partners in both countries would want to find out is *what the current level of PSM and intrinsic motivation actually is; how this differs* between various types of public officials in terms of their age, experience, number of years in the service, and level of seniority; and *how more intrinsic and mission focused motivations may be stimulated and ignited* in various types of public officials that are currently purely extrinsically motivated. After all, restoring and/or enhancing the intrinsic motivation of public officials is part of the key mission of UNDP and their partners.

Thus, to meaningfully research work motivation of public officials in Pakistan and Kazakhstan it is useful to distinguish between two types or "clusters" of motivational drivers: PSM and extrinsic motivations. Extrinsic motivation is part of the discourse of Self-Determination-Theory¹⁷ that suggests a wide range of motivations guide human behaviour. SDT suggests individuals' actions are a direct result of their current motivators ("I took a government job because it offers steady pay to support my family's needs"), and thus more affected by chance and direct survival and recognition needs rather than deep-rooted PSM-like drivers, particularly in contexts characterized by financial survival and high incidence of corruption¹⁸. Others have even suggested in the context of East Asian countries that the explicit extrinsic driver "love for money" is a key factor for entering and staying in public service jobs.¹⁹

A need for an alternative framework, therefore, exists, that would attempt to encompass both idealistic and materialistic aspects of motivation to join public service in non-Western, developing country contexts, and take into account various contextual factors: political regime, societal and organisational culture, social and religious beliefs, formal and informal relationships between politicians and public servants (Ritz, 2015; Van der Wal, 2013), and public service ethos and values (Rayner, Williams, Lawton and Allinson, 2011)²⁰. Understanding public service motivation from both angles will help to manage, improve and enhance public service behaviours: address difficulties, increase productivity, relieve occupational anxiety.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Survey design

To construct a meaningful survey instrument to measure the various dimensions of public employee motivation in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, that can also be employed in subsequent studies by the UNDP and their partners in other parts of the world, a strategic review was conducted of key literature on public sector employee motivation in developing countries from 2000-2016. Earlier award-winning work from the applicant based on a previous UNDP assignment as well as work by UNDPs Global Centre for Public Service Excellence, and others²¹ has been conducive in establishing a baseline framework.

So, rather than conducting another broad and generic review of the literature and 'reinvent the wheel', the review undertaken here undergirding the construction of the survey instrument focused on the survey items and instruments used in studies measuring various types of motivations of public employees in developing contexts, most particularly in Asia. This review produced a set of validated items to measure the key variables distinguished in Tables 3 and 4. They will make up the global part of the questionnaire.

To produce a set of tailored items and questions for the country specific parts of the questionnaires for Pakistan and Kazakhstan, we conducted two 70-minute focus groups with two senior government officials, and one private sector employee from Pakistan as participants, and five government officials from Kazakhstan, using the "Delphi Method".²² The participants in these focus groups that we conducted on 16 and 24 August 2016 are students at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy from three different graduate programs – Master in Public Policy (MPP), Master in Public Administration (MPA), and Master in Public Management (MPM), and from the MPP and MPA program of the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University.

The format produced interactive, deliberative and respectful (though not necessarily consensual) exchanges of views guided by engagement questions and exploration questions²³. Examples of such questions included: Why would an individual in your country join the public service? What would be the main reasons to remain within the public service? How do job security, pay, and career prospects compare with the private sector? Which recent reforms and developments may have affected employee motivations in the public sector? How can HRM policies stimulate intrinsic motivations? The responses to these questions, in combination with the feedback from the project team in Pakistan and the advisory panel from UNDP, resulted in 14 additional survey items and 2 open questions for Pakistan and 10 additional survey items and 2 open questions for Kazakhstan making up the country specific part of the questionnaire. It would be hard to obtain through desk research.

4.2 Sampling and distribution

In order for the study to produce results with the highest potential relevance and significance, it is important that the sample consists of a mix of junior, mid-level, and senior officials from a number of agencies and departments; to balance feasibility with generalizability. In close collaboration with the project team in and agencies on the ground, we managed to collect 208 valid and completed questionnaires from Pakistan, and 740 valid and completed questionnaires from Kazakhstan, a number that exceeded our expectations prior to the study.

4.3 Types of items and questions used

What kind of items and questions did we include in the questionnaire? Based on recent work of scholars in Asia, the questionnaire will include items and questions on both intrinsic and extrinsic drivers²⁴ such as "balancing work and family obligations", in addition to the standard items about PSM (e.g., "meaningful public service is very important to me").²⁵ The questionnaire consisted of three main sections:

The **first section** will contain a number of standard questions on control variables pertaining to the respondent and his/her organization: age, gender, educational background, type of agency, length of tenure and work experience, the type of function (administrative, advisory, managerial, or executive) and the current position of respondent (as shown in Table 1).

Only items that have been validated by at least two studies published in top-tier academic journals were included in the global section questionnaire; more so, we used the latest scales from publications focusing on international comparisons and non-Western settings in particular, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.

The **second - global - section** contains generic items on career motivation and job motivation. Items recently used and validated in various international settings based on the initial work of Perry were included²⁶, as well as items used to measure extrinsic motivations. Respondents were asked whether they agree; on a 5-point Likert scale, with answer categories from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. In addition, we included items on a variety of individual and organizational factors that act as antecedents or products of motivation:

The items in Tables 3, 4, and 5 make up the global section of the questionnaire that will form a validated and robust instrument that the UNDP and their partners can apply across the globe to measure and then compare motivational profiles of various types of public officials, functions, and agencies. In addition, Table 6 and 7 display the country specific parts of the respective questionnaires in both countries. In this comparative report, we only compare the responses to the items in the global part. The individual country reports we produced contain the results for the country specific items.

4.4 Statistical measures and analyses used

A range of standard tests were conducted to analyse the data:

- Cronbach Alpha reliability tests to test the internal validity of the combined variables (e.g., PSM, extrinsic motivation) that sets of items aim to reliably measure. If scales comprised of various items validated in previous studies produce alphas of around .6 and above, the combined variables show sufficient internal validity can be used for the descriptive and comparative tests. If not, items can be regrouped and/or used separately in subsequent analyses. The alphas for all the scales are reported in Appendix 1.
- Descriptives of all items (means (M), median, standard deviation (SD), standard error) to observe which motivational types are most important, and for which groups, and how various groups of respondents score on the various items.
- Standard two-tailed T-tests to test whether differences are significant between groups with more and less years in service, function groups (managerial vs. non-managerial positions), and respondents from local and national governments in both countries.

Including control variables on age, gender, length of tenure and work experience, and the current function of respondents enable us to differentiate results between various categories and types of officials. This will not only allow for an overall comparison between the three types of motivation distinguished before – their frequency, importance, and the extent to which they are significantly different between respondents in both countries – but also between younger and more senior officials, executive versus advisory and administrative functions, and other key dimensions.

5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Differences between samples and respondent characteristics

1. The samples of the two countries vary in size: the number of respondents in Kazakhstan is more than thrice as big as that in Pakistan (208 versus 740). There are various reasons for this: the survey in Kazakhstan was distributed to a larger number of local governments, the project team on the ground started the distribution sooner than the office in Pakistan (leaving more time for responses to come in), and public servants may have generally been more enthusiastic to participate, incentivized by a letter from the Ministry for Public Service.
2. In terms of age and gender, both samples reflect the differences between the public service populations in both countries, with the Pakistani sample showing a fair distribution across the various age categories with a predominantly male public service, while 70 percent of our Kazakhstan respondents are under 39 (Kazakhstan has a relatively young public sector workforce), and more than half are female. This key difference is also reflected in the years of tenure of the public servants in our sample, with almost half of the Pakistani respondents clocking 13 or more years and more than half of our Kazakh respondents clocking 9 years or less.

Table 3. Respondent characteristics compared

| Characteristics | Pakistan (n=208) | Kazakhstan (n=740) |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Age | | |
| <29 | 25 | 34.4 |
| 30-39 | 26.9 | 35.2 |
| 40-49 | 22.6 | 17.3 |
| 50-59 | 23.1 | 12.4 |
| 60> | 0.5 | 0.7 |
| Gender | | |
| M | 80.8 | 42.2 |
| F | 16.8 | 57.8 |
| Years in service | | |
| <4 | 21.2 | 39.1 |
| 5-8 | 15.4 | 16.2 |
| 9-12 | 9.6 | 17 |
| 13-16 | 8.7 | 13 |
| 17-20 | 7.2 | 5.8 |
| 20> | 29.8 | 8.9 |
| Educational level | | |
| Diploma | 8.7 | 0.2 |
| Bachelor's | 22.6 | 48.6 |
| Master's | 55.3 | 39.3 |
| Other | 3.4 | 11.9 |
| Government level | | |
| National | 15.4 | 30.8 |
| Local | 22.1 | 69.2 |
| Regional | 59.6 | |
| Post level | | |
| Managing | 68.8 | 28.7 |
| Non-managing | 26.4 | 71.3 |
| Job function | | |
| Policy planning | 11.5 | 11.5 |
| Policy implementation | 18.3 | 43.6 |
| Regulation and oversight | 4.3 | 17.2 |
| Administrative and management | 55.8 | 27.7 |
| Private sector/NGO experience | | |
| Yes | 44.7 | 54.3 |
| No | 52.4 | 45.7 |

- The Pakistani sample includes more civil servants holding Master's degree (55.7%) in comparison to Kazakhstan (11.9%).
- Government level in both countries is divided into national (central) and local (local and regional in Pakistan). National level is better represented in the Kazakhstani sample (30.8%), while in Pakistan local and regional levels comprise 81.7% of the sample.
- Conversely, the post level in the Pakistani sample is higher than that in the Kazakhstani one: 68.8% of the respondents hold managing positions against 28.7% of those in Kazakhstan.
- The most common job function for respondents in the Pakistani sample is administration and management, which is in line with the dominant post level. In the Kazakhstani sample, the prevailing job function is policy implementation.

7. In both samples, the number of respondents who have private sector and NGO work experience is roughly the same as the number of the ones who don't, with the Kazakhstani sample comprising slightly more of those who have non-public sector experience.

5.2. Motivation, job, and organization (global items)

Table 4 presents a comparative overview of the three motivational types analysed as part of this study for Pakistan and Kazakhstan. It displays the mean score for each motivational type calculated across all the respondents in the dataset (on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest). Confidence levels of statistically significant differences indicated with one, two, or three stars correspond with .05, .01, and .001, like in the subsequent parts of section 5.

Separate mean scores are also displayed for each of the four dimensions of the PSM. As table 4 shows, public servants in Pakistan demonstrate a higher level of PSM (4.171) and intrinsic motivation (4.190) than their colleagues from Kazakhstan (3.931 and 4.105 respectively). Kazakhstani public servants, in turn score higher on extrinsic motivation (3.731).

In addition, our survey measured the job satisfaction, person-organization-fit, and community citizenship behaviour. Kazakhstani public servants score higher on community citizenship behaviour than their Pakistani counterparts, while Pakistani public servants display higher scores on job satisfaction and person-organization fit.

The results are statistically significant for all motivational types with the exception of intrinsic motivation and "attraction to policy making" dimension of PSM.

Table 4. Comparing differences in motivational types


| Motivation, Job, and Organization | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Mean | Mean | |
| PSM | 4.171 | 3.931 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.259 | 4.223 | 0.404 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.173 | 4.022 | 0.001** |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.128 | 3.903 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.099 | 3.575 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.463 | 3.731 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.190 | 4.105 | 0.091 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.931 | 3.613 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.742 | 3.629 | 0.037* |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.217 | 4.279 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$


5.3 Comparing groups and types of public servants

In this part, we compare how various subgroups score on the motivational types as well as the job attitudes.

Figure 1a compares scores of female public servants in Kazakhstan and Pakistan, while Figure 1b does the same for male public servants. Female public servants in Pakistan display higher scores for all motivational types except for extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour. They score significantly higher on PSM and two of its dimensions, intrinsic motivation, job satisfaction, and person-organization fit.

Figure 1a. Differences between subgroups: gender

To a lesser extent, the same is true for male public servants, with those from Pakistan demonstrating significantly higher scores on PSM and two of its dimensions, and job satisfaction, higher scores for many of the other motivational items, with the exception of extrinsic motivation, community citizenship behaviour and “attraction to policy making” dimension of PSM.

Figure 1b. Differences between subgroups: gender

Figures 2a and 2b compare public servants with similar educational levels in the two countries, with public servants holding vocational qualifications, bachelor and specialist degrees, grouped together to compare with public servants who hold a Master’s degree or higher. Public servants from Pakistan score higher across all motivational types except for extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour, and this is true for both educational levels used in the comparison.

For the public servants holding vocational and bachelor level qualifications results are statistically significant for PSM and its two dimensions – “compassion” and “self-sacrifice”, job satisfaction and community citizenship behaviour. For public servants with qualifications of a Master’s level and above the results are statistically significant for all motivational types except for intrinsic motivation and person organization fit, as well as “attraction to policy making” dimension of PSM.

Figure 2a. Differences between subgroups: educational level






Figure 2b. Differences between subgroups: educational level




Figures 3a and 3b compare junior and more senior public servants of the two countries. Those aged 39 and under in Pakistan score slightly higher on all motivational types and job attributes, except for extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour which is in line with the previous comparisons. Only for extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest” differences are not statistically significant.

Figure 3a. Differences between subgroups: age




A similar picture emerges for public servants aged 40 and above. The results are statistically significant for all motivational types except for intrinsic motivation, person-organization fit, and “attraction to policy making” dimension of PSM.

Figure 3b. Differences between subgroups: age




Figures 4a and 4b compare public servants from the local and the central level in Pakistan and Kazakhstan. The picture is slightly different with Kazakhstani public servants at the central level displaying slightly higher scores not only on extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour, but also on intrinsic motivation and person organization fit, as well as “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest” PSM dimensions. The results are only statistically significant for extrinsic motivation, community citizenship behaviour and “self-sacrifice”, however.


Figure 4a. Differences between subgroups: experience level




The results for public servants at the local level in the two countries are more in line with the previous comparisons of subgroups. Pakistani public servants score higher on all motivational types except for extrinsic motivation, and community citizenship behaviour. Results are statistically significant for all motivational types except for intrinsic motivation and “attraction to policy making”.

Figure 4b. Differences between subgroups: experience level

In Figure 5a, results are compared between junior (less than 9 years of experience) and more senior (9 and more years of experience) public servants in terms of length of their tenure in both countries. Once again, differences between both groups are marginal, with Pakistani public servants of a junior level displaying higher scores than their counterparts in Kazakhstan across motivational types except for extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour, as well as “attraction to policy making”. The differences in mean scores in job satisfaction, extrinsic motivation, person organization fit, and “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest” are not statistically significant.

Figure 5a. Differences between subgroups: supervisory responsibilities

Public servants with a more extensive work experience display a similar distribution of scores between the two countries. The results are statistically significant for all motivational types except for intrinsic motivation, person organization fit and “attraction to policy making”.

Figure 5b. Differences between subgroups: supervisory responsibilities

Figures 6a and 6b display the comparison between public servants from Pakistan and Kazakhstan with and without supervisory responsibilities. Here, a slightly different picture emerges from the comparison. Public servants with supervisory responsibilities in Kazakhstan in addition to scoring higher on extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour as in the previous analyses, also appear to be slightly more intrinsically motivated and display a higher person organization fit, as well as a higher score on “attraction to policy making”. The differences are not statistically significant for intrinsic motivation, person organization fit and “attraction to policy making”, however.

The comparison results for the public servants without supervisory responsibilities is more in line with the previous analyses – Pakistani public servants score higher on all motivational types with the exception of extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour. The results for extrinsic motivation, “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest” are not statistically significant.



Figure 6a. Differences between subgroups: government level

Figure 6b. Differences between subgroups: government level

Figures 7a – 7d illustrate the differences in means scores of public servants from Pakistan and Kazakhstan carrying out different job functions. Again, the results are in line with the analyses from previous comparisons with Pakistani public servants scoring higher across motivational types except for extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour, regardless of the job function. The only exceptions are public servants with administrative and management job function in Pakistan scoring higher than their counterparts in Kazakhstan; and public servants with the policy implementation function in both countries displaying equal scores on person organization fit; with both differences being statistically significant. In other instances, exceptions have no statistical significance (e.g. job satisfaction in policy planning; person organization fit in regulation and oversight).


Figure 7a. Differences between subgroups: job function

Figure 7b. Differences between subgroups: job function




Figure 7c. Differences between subgroups: job function





Figure 7d. Differences between subgroups: job function



Figures 8a and 8b compare public servants in the two countries who have previously worked for NGOs or the private sector to those who have no such experience. The results for those public servants who have previously worked in the private sector and/or NGOs are as per previous analyses, however, the difference in scores in extrinsic motivation is not statistically significant. The same is true for differences in intrinsic motivation, person organization fit and two of the PSM dimensions – “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest”.

Figure 8a. Differences between subgroups: previous experience in private sector/NGO







Figure 8b. Differences between subgroups: previous experience in private sector/NGO



The picture is similar for public servants with no experience outside of the public service. Kazakhstani public servants score higher on extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour with both differences being statistically significant. Kazakhstan’s slightly higher score on intrinsic motivation has no statistical significance; neither does the difference in person organization fit and “attraction to policy making”.

Figures 9a and 9b display the differences in mean scores for public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan who have aspirations to switch sectors in the future. Similar to previous analyses Kazakhstani public servants score higher in extrinsic motivation and community citizenship behaviour, with differences across all motivational types being statistically significant.

The same is true for public servants who have no intentions to move sectors. The differences in intrinsic motivation and “attraction to policy making” and “commitment to public interest” are not statistically significant.

Figure 9a. Differences between subgroups: aspiration to work in private sector/NGO in the future**Figure 9b.** Differences between subgroups: aspiration to work in private sector/NGO in the future

5.4 Country Specific Items

In this part, we report on the country specific items that were include in both surveys, and how they compare between Kazakhstan in Pakistan within various subgroups distinguished in our dataset. Tables 5a-5d and 6a-6d display comparisons between the stated groups with regard to their job, work and career attitudes, and reasons for joining the public service.

Table 5a: Comparing Job, Work, and Career Attitudes (overall, gender, age)

| Attitude | Overall mean | | Gender | | | | Age | | | |
|---|--------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|--------|
| | PK | KZ | Female | | Male | | 39 and under | | 40 and above | |
| | | | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. | 4.13** | 3.94** | 4.31** | 3.93** | 4.11* | 3.94* | 4.23*** | 3.88*** | 4.06 | 4.07 |
| There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. | 3.26*** | 3.68*** | 3.06* | 3.62* | 3.32*** | 3.77*** | 3.20*** | 3.65*** | 3.35** | 3.75** |
| There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. | 2.97*** | 3.50*** | 3.00 | 3.41 | 2.96*** | 3.63*** | 2.95*** | 3.54*** | 3.00* | 3.40* |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|--------|------|------|--------|--------|---------|---------|------|------|
| Given the opportunity, I would leave my current job to take a job in a different sector. | 3.45** | 3.14** | 3.20 | 3.10 | 3.50** | 3.20** | 3.63*** | 3.15*** | 3.27 | 3.12 |
| My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. | 3.02 | 2.91 | 3.12 | 2.98 | 2.99 | 2.82 | 2.88 | 2.86 | 3.17 | 3.03 |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 5a shows the following results. Differences in overall mean scores are statistically significant for all the job attitudes cited with the exception of satisfaction with the salary package. Public servants in Kazakhstan regardless of gender score lower on awareness of work expectations, but higher on their perception of opportunities for professional development and promotion. Male Pakistani public servants are more likely to move to a different sector than their counterparts in Kazakhstan. The same is true for Kazakhstani public servants 39 years old and younger. Older public servants in Kazakhstan also have more positive perceptions on availability of professional development and promotion opportunities than their colleagues in Pakistan.

Table 5b: Comparing Job, Work, and Career Attitudes (education, supervisory responsibilities, government level)

| Attitude | Educational level | | | | Supervisory responsibilities | | | | Government level | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|------------------|-------|---------|---------|
| | Vocational, Bachelor and Specialist | | Master | | Yes | | No | | Central | | Local | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. | 4.25** | 3.93** | 4.10* | 3.85* | 4.06 | 4.05 | 4.27** | 3.89** | 4.13 | 3.93 | 4.14** | 3.94** |
| There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. | 3.49 | 3.67 | 3.15** | 3.61** | 3.28*** | 3.85*** | 3.11* | 3.61* | 3.38 | 3.70 | 3.27*** | 3.67*** |
| There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. | 3.25 | 3.51 | 2.81*** | 3.41*** | 2.85*** | 3.62*** | 3.09* | 3.45* | 2.81* | 3.47* | 2.98*** | 3.51*** |
| Given the opportunity, I would leave my current job to take a job in a different sector. | 3.37 | 3.09 | 3.54 | 3.32 | 3.47*** | 3.02*** | 3.42 | 3.19 | 3.29 | 3.23 | 3.47*** | 3.10*** |
| My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. | 2.94 | 2.88 | 2.98* | 2.59* | 3.05 | 2.97 | 2.89 | 2.89 | 2.81 | 2.98 | 3.07 | 2.88 |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 5b reports statistically significant differences between respondents from the two countries within subgroups based in education, supervisory responsibilities and government level. Kazakhstani holders of vocational and bachelor level qualifications have a less clear idea on work tasks. The same is true for those public servants in Kazakhstan who have a Master's degree. At the same time, Master degree holders in Pakistan have a less positive outlook on professional development and career opportunities than their counterparts in Kazakhstan, but a more positive view of their salary package.

Those in leadership positions in Kazakhstan report higher scores on items related to career and professional development opportunities and are less likely to move sectors. Public servants in the central government in Kazakhstan report higher scores on promotion opportunities than their colleagues in Pakistan, whereas those at the local level have higher scores on promotion and professional development and display a lower likelihood of moving sectors, however they are less aware of the work expectations than those at the local level in Pakistan.

Table 5c: Comparing Job, Work, and Career Attitudes (experience level, previous experience in other sectors, aspiration to work in other sectors in the future)

| Attitude | Experience level | | | | NGO/private sector experience | | | | Aspiration to work in NGO/private sector | | | |
|--|------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--|---------|--------|--------|
| | Junior | | Senior | | Yes | | No | | Yes | | No | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. | 4.13* | 3.89* | 4.06 | 3.99 | 4.14** | 3.91** | 4.11 | 3.96 | 4.11** | 3.88*** | 4.15* | 3.96* |
| There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. | 3.28* | 3.67* | 3.29** | 3.70** | 3.01*** | 3.68*** | 3.46 | 3.68 | 3.22* | 3.56* | 3.32** | 3.74** |
| There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. | 2.79*** | 3.59*** | 2.99** | 3.38** | 2.77*** | 3.47*** | 3.10*** | 3.52*** | 2.86*** | 3.38*** | 3.11** | 3.56** |
| Given the opportunity, I would leave my current job to take a job in a different sector. | 3.69*** | 3.16*** | 3.31 | 3.12 | 3.75*** | 3.20*** | 3.18 | 3.09 | 3.68 | 3.69 | 3.05 | 2.88 |
| My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. | 2.83 | 2.89 | 3.13 | 2.94 | 2.85 | 2.78 | 3.16 | 3.02 | 2.80 | 2.61 | 3.34 | 3.05 |

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Like in previous parts, significant differences can be observed between public servants of different experience level, as well as with and without aspirations to work in other sectors post-public sector. In Kazakhstan, junior level public servants are less aware of the tasks expected of them at work but are more positive about professional development and promotion, also displaying lower scores on choosing to leave the current job. Those that have previous work experience in other sectors in Kazakhstan are more positive about career opportunities and professional development opportunities in their current organizations than their counterparts in Pakistan and are also less likely to move jobs.

Again, their awareness of work expectations is lower than of their colleagues in Pakistan. Similarly, public servants that aspire for employment in other sectors in Kazakhstan have a more positive outlook on professional development and career opportunities than those in Pakistan, albeit with lower awareness of work expectations. The same holds true for public servants with no such aspirations.

Table 5d: Comparing Job, Work, and Career Attitudes (job scope)

| Attitude | Job scope | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|--------------------------|------|-------------------------------|---------|
| | Policy planning | | Policy implementation | | Regulation and oversight | | Administrative and management | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. | 4.00 | 3.78 | 4.24* | 3.94* | 4.22 | 3.98 | 4.04 | 3.96 |
| There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. | 3.33 | 3.73 | 3.45 | 3.63 | 3.56 | 3.67 | 3.17*** | 3.73*** |
| There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. | 3.00 | 3.59 | 3.00* | 3.53* | 3.67 | 3.46 | 2.84*** | 3.44*** |
| Given the opportunity, I would leave my current job to take a job in a different sector. | 3.57* | 3.02* | 3.37 | 3.14 | 3.00 | 3.08 | 3.54** | 3.18** |
| My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. | 2.71 | 2.90 | 3.21 | 2.95 | 3.33 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 2.88 |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

The differences between public servants in two countries occupying jobs with different job scopes display various levels of statistical significance in several instances. Those with a policy planning function in Kazakhstan are less likely to choose to move out of their current job when compared to Pakistan. Public servants carrying out policy implementation functions in Kazakhstan have less clear ideas on work expectations than their counterparts in Pakistan and a more positive perception of promotion opportunities. Public servants with administrative and management functions in Kazakhstan are more confident about professional development and career opportunities and are less likely to leave their current jobs than their counterparts in Pakistan.

Table 6a: Comparing reasons behind joining public service (overall, gender, age)

| Reason | Overall mean | | Gender | | | | Age | | | |
|---|--------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | PK | KZ | Female | | Male | | 39 and under | | 40 and above | |
| | | | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| Stable, secure and promising future. | 3.91** | 4.13** | 3.91 | 4.14 | 3.90* | 4.12* | 3.92* | 4.14* | 3.89* | 4.11* |
| A chance to make a contribution to important decisions (in Pakistan "A chance to acquire authority and influence on important issues"). | 3.27*** | 4.11*** | 3.40** | 4.05** | 3.26*** | 4.21*** | 3.38*** | 4.15*** | 3.18*** | 4.03*** |
| A chance to learn new things. | 4.02 | 4.00 | 4.18 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 3.99 | 4.14 | 4.04 | 3.88 | 3.91 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| High prestige and social status. | 3.43 | 3.45 | 3.56 | 3.45 | 3.42 | 3.44 | 3.42 | 3.49 | 3.47 | 3.35 |
| To increase opportunities for earning income. | 3.42*** | 2.84*** | 3.43* | 2.89* | 3.42*** | 2.77*** | 3.37*** | 2.84*** | 3.51*** | 2.82*** |
| To build a strong network of connections. | 2.92* | 2.69* | 2.70 | 2.63 | 2.98 | 2.78 | 3.00 | 2.79 | 2.86** | 2.46** |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Public servants in Kazakhstan rank stable, secure and promising future the highest with a chance to make a difference closely following, while their Pakistani colleagues assign greater importance to learning new things and then to a stable future. The differences for four out of the six reasons cited are statistically significant, with Kazakhstani public servants assigning higher importance to a stable future and a chance to make a contribution and lesser importance to earning income and building a network of connections.

When it comes to differences based on gender the only statistically significant results are for differences in a chance to make a greater contribution (more important for women in Kazakhstan than in Pakistan) and earning income (of greater importance to women in Pakistan); and stable future, a chance to contribute (both more important in Kazakhstan) and earn income (more important in Pakistan) for men. The same is true for public servants aged 39 and under. For those 40 years and above, the difference in scores on building a strong network of connections, which is of greater importance in Pakistan, also acquires statistical significance.

Table 6b: Comparing reasons behind joining public service (education, supervisory responsibilities, government level)

| Reason | Educational level | | | | Supervisory responsibilities | | | | Government level | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Vocational, Bachelor and Specialist | | Master | | Yes | | No | | Central | | Local | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| Stable, secure and promising future. | 3.85* | 4.13* | 3.90 | 4.01 | 3.84** | 4.09** | 4.05 | 4.14 | 3.72** | 4.20** | 4.06 | 4.10 |
| A chance to make a contribution to important decisions (in Pakistan "A chance to acquire authority and influence on important issues"). | 3.49*** | 4.10*** | 3.14** | 4.16*** | 3.15*** | 4.15*** | 3.47** | 4.10** | 3.19*** | 4.18*** | 3.97*** | 4.09*** |
| A chance to learn new things. | 4.08 | 3.98 | 3.95 | 3.99 | 3.89 | 4.03 | 4.29** | 3.98** | 3.84 | 4.06 | 3.41 | 3.97 |
| High prestige and social status. | 3.38 | 3.42 | 3.39** | 3.80** | 3.37 | 3.40 | 3.56 | 3.46 | 3.58 | 3.62 | 3.49 | 3.37 |
| To increase opportunities for earning income. | 3.54*** | 2.79*** | 3.31* | 2.92* | 3.30*** | 2.75*** | 3.71*** | 2.87*** | 3.10 | 2.95 | 3.27*** | 2.79*** |
| To build a strong network of connections. | 2.89 | 2.59 | 2.87 | 3.04 | 2.88* | 2.63* | 2.93 | 2.71 | 3.32* | 2.90* | 2.86* | 2.60* |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

As seen from Table 6b the results for differences based on educational level, supervisory responsibilities and government level are consistent with previous analyses – Kazakhstani public servants considering stable future and an opportunity to influence major decisions more important than their Pakistani colleagues and earning income, and building a strong network of connections – less so.

Table 6c: Comparing reasons behind joining public service (experience level, previous experience in other sectors, aspiration to work in other sectors in the future)

| Reason | Experience level | | | | NGO/private sector experience | | | | Aspiration to work in NGO/private sector | | | |
|---|------------------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--|---------|---------|---------|
| | Junior | | Senior | | Yes | | No | | Yes | | No | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| Stable, secure and promising future. | 3.92* | 4.16* | 3.93 | 4.09 | 4.03 | 4.17 | 3.81** | 4.09** | 3.96 | 3.95 | 3.86** | 4.21** |
| A chance to make a contribution to important decisions (in Pakistan “A chance to acquire authority and influence on important issues”). | 3.33*** | 4.18*** | 3.14*** | 4.03*** | 3.20*** | 4.14*** | 3.28*** | 4.09*** | 3.14*** | 4.01*** | 3.42*** | 4.17*** |
| A chance to learn new things. | 4.14 | 4.05 | 3.91 | 3.94 | 4.08 | 4.02 | 3.96 | 3.98 | 4.04 | 3.93 | 3.99 | 4.03 |
| High prestige and social status. | 3.40 | 3.53 | 3.44 | 3.34 | 3.47 | 3.47 | 3.39 | 3.43 | 3.35 | 3.42 | 3.55 | 3.46 |
| To increase opportunities for earning income. | 3.34** | 2.86** | 3.42*** | 2.82*** | 3.32*** | 2.80*** | 3.47*** | 2.87*** | 3.37*** | 2.89*** | 3.46*** | 2.81*** |
| To build a strong network of connections. | 3.03 | 2.83 | 2.82* | 2.52* | 2.84 | 2.69 | 2.97* | 2.69* | 2.90 | 2.76 | 2.91 | 2.66 |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

The same is true for results of the comparisons based on experience level, previous experience in the private sector and NGOs as well as the aspiration to work in those sectors in the future.

Table 6d: Comparing reasons behind joining public service (job scope)

| Reason | Job scope | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|---------|-----------------------|--------|--------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|---------|
| | Policy planning | | Policy implementation | | Regulation and oversight | | Administrative and management | |
| | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ | PK | KZ |
| Stable, secure and promising future. | 3.25** | 4.15** | 4.13 | 4.14 | 3.56 | 3.99 | 3.97* | 4.18* |
| A chance to make a contribution to important decisions (in Pakistan "A chance to acquire authority and influence on important issues"). | 2.63*** | 4.15*** | 3.55** | 4.11** | 3.44 | 4.14 | 3.26*** | 4.11*** |
| A chance to learn new things. | 3.88 | 4.04 | 4.29* | 4.00* | 3.78 | 3.93 | 3.92 | 4.02 |
| High prestige and social status. | 3.04** | 3.67** | 3.63 | 3.42 | 3.44 | 3.42 | 3.43 | 3.49 |
| To increase opportunities for earning income. | 3.00 | 3.16 | 3.58** | 2.90** | 3.56** | 2.67** | 3.41*** | 2.75*** |
| To build a strong network of connections. | 2.91 | 3.02 | 2.89 | 2.65 | 2.22 | 2.72 | 2.91* | 2.62* |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

When it comes to opportunities for earning income and building a network of connections the results are consistent with the previous comparisons, with the added statistical significance of the differences in assigning importance to learning new things (higher in Pakistan for those with a policy implementation function) and a social status (higher in Kazakhstan for those with a policy planning function).

Table 7: Comparing obstacles for enhancing motivation in order of importance (n = coded statements in percentages)

| Pakistan | Kazakhstan |
|---|--|
| Limited pay, benefits and career prospects (46.7) | Limited pay, benefits and career prospects (67.1) |
| Political interference/nepotism (30.8) | Political interference/nepotism (16.6) |
| Poor attitude and intimidation (9.7) | Uneven task distribution and long working hours (11.8) |
| Lack of training (6.8) | Poor work attitudes and atmosphere (2.7) |
| Poor facilities and working environment (6) | Poor facilities and working environment (1.8) |

Many public servants we surveyed mention limited primary and secondary benefits and career prospects as the main obstacle for further enhancing the motivation of public servants: almost half of our Pakistani respondents emphasize this issue, and so do more than two third of our Kazakh respondents. Complaining about pay is one thing (who wouldn't like to get paid more?) but one issue that stands out is the alleged lack of meritocracy and fairness when it comes to promotion (this is also central to the second category in the table). Fixing this issue, or at least the perception, seems paramount for recruiting and retaining young talented graduates, particularly when primary and secondary benefits cannot match those of the private sector. A competitive central entrance exam is one way to bring in the best and brightest (at least in academic terms), but HRM systems need to maximize the potential of these talented young individuals afterwards by keeping them motivated. Having a sense that career opportunities are looming if one performs well is key here.

Mentioned less frequently are poor work attitudes, atmosphere, and conditions, and training. Pakistani public servants also emphasize uneven task distribution and long working hours explicitly, whereas Kazakh public servants mention training as a separate obstacle (while our Pakistani respondents do not).

Table 8: Comparing efforts to increase performance in order of importance (n = coded statements, in percentages)

| Pakistan | Kazakhstan |
|--|---|
| Increase remuneration and introduce secondary benefits (44) | Increase remuneration and introduce secondary benefits (76.8) |
| Training (23) | Combat nepotism and patronage, more meritocracy (11.3) |
| Put an end to political interference and recruit based on merit (12.8) | Clearly define job functions, responsibilities and work processes (6.7) |
| Clearly define job functions, responsibilities and work processes (11) | Training (3.2) |
| Work conditions and work environment (9.2) | Work conditions and work environment (2) |

In turn, Table 8 displays the five key factors that, according to our respondents, would contribute to efforts by public servants to increase their performance. Overall, the factors distinguished mirror the obstacles emphasized before: they suggest antidotes to the biggest illnesses in the system. Indeed, again almost half of the statements from our Pakistani respondents and more than here quarters of the Kazakh statements include primary and secondary benefits as a factor, again with performance related pay (and better measurement of performance) as key elements. Public servants also stress the importance of a clear definition of tasks, roles, and responsibilities. Training, however, is an even more important issue for the Pakistani respondents this time, while being much less important to our Kazakh respondents. To a lesser extent, both groups mention working conditions as important factors.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

6.1 Key conclusions and take-aways

From our comparative analysis of the quantitative survey data, we can draw nine key conclusions:

1. The public servants from Pakistan surveyed in our study score significantly higher on public service motivation (PSM), comprising idealistic and altruistic motivations for being in the public service, than public servants in Kazakhstan. Concomitantly, the score of Pakistani public servants on extrinsic motivations, comprising more self-oriented, materialistic reasons for being in the public service, is significantly lower than in Kazakhstan.
2. The public servants surveyed in our study in both countries give the highest score to the “attraction to policymaking” dimension, indicating that the content of their job is a key motivator. Pakistani public servants display a higher score on each of the PSM dimensions than their Kazakh counterparts.
3. Respondents from Pakistan also report higher scores on job satisfaction and person-organization fit than their colleagues from Kazakhstan, in line with their higher score on PSM. Public servants from both countries give the highest score to community citizenship, demonstrating their orientation on public value creation for their fellow citizens. Again, Pakistani public servants demonstrate higher scores than those from Kazakhstan.
4. Public servants from the local government in Pakistan report higher scores than those from the local government in Kazakhstan on all items, apart from the PSM dimension of self-sacrifice, and extrinsic motivation. The results at the national level are more uneven: Pakistani public servants at the national level score higher on PSM overall but display slightly lower scores on the two dimensions of PSM: compassion and self-sacrifice, than their Kazakh counterparts.

5. When comparing more junior public servants (with 8 years of service or less) and more senior public servants (with 9 years of service or more) in both countries, the results demonstrate that both junior and senior public servants in Pakistan score higher than their colleagues from Kazakhstan across all motivational types, but extrinsic motivation.
6. The same is true for public servants in our sample who occupy non-managerial positions: those in Pakistan report higher scores on all motivational types, except for extrinsic motivation, than those in Kazakhstan. The picture is somewhat different for the managerial level public servants: in addition to a higher score on extrinsic motivation, Kazakhstani managerial level public servants also score higher on job satisfaction and person-organization fit.
7. Comparison of job, work and career attitudes between the two countries reveals that the public servants in Kazakhstan score lower on the awareness of job expectation than those in Pakistan, but have lower scores for willingness to leave for a job in a different sector. Kazakhstani public servants also score higher on the questions about opportunities for professional development and promotion. Pakistani public servants, however, have higher scores for the question gauging their satisfaction with the pay level.
8. When asked to indicate their reason for joining the public service in the first place, public servants from Kazakhstan give a higher preference to “a stable and secure future”, and “a chance to influence important decisions”, while their colleagues in Pakistan name “a chance to learn new things” and “stable and secure future” as their top reasons.
9. Strikingly, even though they report significantly higher scores on intrinsic motivation, PSM, and job satisfaction, respondents from Pakistan score significantly lower than their Kazakh counterparts when asked whether they see opportunities for promotion and professional development (this may also explain why they emphasize training much more than the Kazakh respondents in the next section). Arguably, their high levels of motivation are a key reason for continuing to work hard given their less than ideal conditions. However, as they are also significantly more inclined than their Kazakh counterparts to leave the public sector if a better opportunity arises, the HRM implication is that this motivation should not be misused because higher turnover may quickly set in if they are overly stretched.

Obstacles to better performance

The qualitative data acquired through the open questions further contextualize and complement our conclusions, resulting in four additional take-aways about constraints for enhancing motivation:

- 1 “Low salary and lack of promotion opportunities” is by far the most oft-mentioned obstacle for enhancing the motivation of public servants in both countries. In addition to remuneration issues, a lack of merit-based promotion (or the perception thereof) is also frequently mentioned.
- 2 “Political interference” closely follows the issue of pay, both in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Public servants may view management as benefiting certain colleagues or departments and influencing decisions, with performance criteria being not much more than paper tigers.
- 3 “Long working hours and uneven work distribution” is the third most commonly mentioned obstacle in Kazakhstan. It does not, however, seem to be a common issue in Pakistan, where “poor attitude and intimidation” is the third most often mentioned obstacle. For Kazakhstan, “poor attitude” is at number four.
- 4 A number of statements from public servants in our study refers to lack of training (Pakistan), and poor facilities and working environment (both countries) as obstacles to enhancing motivation, but these categories are mentioned by only a small number of respondents.

Overall, the answers from Pakistani respondents are much more evenly distributed across the various categories, with almost half indicating low salary and lack of promotion opportunities, whereas the Kazakh respondents are more pronounced: more than two third of the respondents end up in the first category with the last two categories receiving only few scores.

Enablers of better performance

Lastly, the qualitative data on the respondents' views about the reforms of measures that will boost efforts to increase performance of staff again provide us with three insightful take-aways.

4. As a corollary to the most-oft mentioned obstacle for enhancing the motivation of public servants, the vast majority of the statements from public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan on how their performance should be increased stress the importance of primary and secondary benefits, with bonuses and performance-based pay as well as adjustment of the salary to the inflation rate.
5. Pakistani public servants put the need to enhance training at the second place, while combatting nepotism and corruption is the third most commonly suggested measure. Tackling the issue of corruption is the second most popular proposed measure by Kazakhstani public servants, followed by training (which receives much less attention when compared to the Pakistani respondents).
6. Finally, both Kazakh and Pakistani public servants stress the importance of clearly defining division of labour, function descriptions, and the use of data and evidence to support such process redesign, as well as more effort to improve working conditions and work environment.

Here, the same goes as for the obstacles to performance, with the categories for the Kazakh respondents being even less evenly distributed: this time almost 80 percent mentions primary and secondary benefits as key enablers compared to 44 percent of their Pakistani counterparts. Training is mentioned much more frequently as an enabler of better performance in Pakistan than in Kazakhstan.

6.2 Implications for personnel management and public service reform

From this rich and unique comparative research project into the motivation of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan and their attitudes towards job satisfaction, person-organization-fit, community citizenship behaviour, organizational culture and climate, and the key constraints and opportunities provided by their working environments and career structures, we can distil the following implications for personnel management and public sector reform:

- Primary and secondary benefits are considered important for further improving motivation and performance, but creating fairer working conditions and more individually tailored performance, training, and development schemes are just as important. Future HRM and personnel reform interventions should focus on further improving performance appraisal systems and opportunities for training and promotion (building on recent reforms), as room to improve primary and secondary benefits is expected to remain limited in the years to come. Evidence from successful countries in this regard shows that *performance leadership* is at least as important as importing performance schemes on paper that are not enforced in practice²⁷.
- More autonomy and horizontal coordination tend to enhance motivation and performance in organizational environments in which colleagues are sometimes more respected than superiors (and more top-down management may result in the exact opposite).

The results of this study assist UNDP and their partners to better tailor reform interventions in the areas of public management, HRM, training and capacity building, based on the responses of public officials in Pakistan and their motivational profile. In short, based on the envisioned study, UNDP and their partners are able to *know* and *do* the following:

1. The types of motivation driving public officials in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, and how these types compare between both countries overall, and between various subgroups and agency types in both countries;
2. How public officials in Pakistan and Kazakhstan view their working life, career prospects, and which reforms they consider effective;
3. How UNDP and local agencies can promote incentives to further improve the motivation, job satisfaction, and performance of public servants in Pakistan and Kazakhstan.

6.3 Limitations and future research

This study was part of a pilot project aimed at testing our questionnaire before employing it in a variety of developing countries. For the global part of the questionnaire, we used measurement scales that have been used and validated in reputed, recent international studies into public service motivation and motivation of public servants more broadly. Not all scales produced sufficient reliability scales. So, in the end we rescaled some of our measurements to make sure they met the common standards for validity and reliability. These final scales can be used in future questionnaires aimed at acquiring baseline data on the motivation and job attitudes of public servants in developing countries, although rescaling may be required for each individual new country that participates as some items prove less effective in certain countries²⁸.

A final related issue that merits attention is that of language, translation, and interpretation. The fact that some of the questionnaires were translated from English to Urdu and back (in Pakistan) and all questionnaires were translated from English to Russian and back in Kazakhstan – albeit with the assistance of a native speaking collaborator – may have affected some of the reliability scores for the scales. Respondents may have identified elements of PSM or job satisfaction differently than they would have, had English been their mother tongue. The majority of questionnaires in Pakistan were answered in English given the command of English of Pakistani public servants. This may explain why most of the reliability scores for the initial scales discussed above were higher in Pakistan. Finally, the fact that the scores of Pakistani respondents were higher and their answers to the open questions were more evenly distributed across the coded categories may partly be explained by the considerable difference in sample size.

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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS BY SECTION

Table 1: Items on respondent characteristics

| Respondent characteristics | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. | Educational qualification (diploma, Bachelor degree, Master degree, other) |
| 2. | University major |
| 3. | Age |
| 4. | Gender |
| 5. | Years of public service experience |
| 6. | Current function and job scope (planning, implementation, regulation/oversight, management) |
| 7. | Government level (national, local) |
| 8. | Supervising employees (yes, no) |
| 9. | Private and/or non-profit sector experience prior to joining public service (yes, no) |
| 10. | Future career ambitions in private and/or non-profit sector (yes, no) |

Table 2: Items included in the global section of questionnaire (motivation)

| PSM (dimensions) | Extrinsic Motivation |
|--|--|
| <p><i>Attraction to policy-making</i>²⁹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I'm interested in making public programs that are beneficial for my country or the community I belong to. ▪ Sharing my views on public policies with others is attractive to me. ▪ Seeing people get benefits from the public program I have been deeply involved in brings me a great deal of satisfaction. ▪ Ethical behaviour of public officials is as important as competence. <p><i>Commitment to public interests</i>³⁰</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I unselfishly contribute to my community. ▪ Meaningful public service is very important to me. ▪ I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the community, even if it harmed my interests. ▪ I consider public service my civic duty. <p><i>Self-sacrifice</i>³¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. ▪ Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it. ▪ I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it. ▪ Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good deeds. ▪ I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. ▪ It is definitely more important to me to do good deeds than doing well financially. ▪ Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements. <p><i>Compassion</i>³²</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress ▪ I am often moved by the plight of the underprivileged ▪ I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another. ▪ To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. | <p><i>Remuneration</i>³³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I am motivated to work hard for money. ▪ Money reinforces me to work harder. ▪ I am highly motivated by money. ▪ I am happy with my pay and the amount of work I do. ▪ I am happy with the benefits package accruing in my job. <p><i>Job security</i>³⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Considering the main reasons for choosing your current job, how important was the job security to you? <p><i>Promotion</i>³⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ My performance depends on whether I expect to be promoted. |

Table 3: Items included in the global section of questionnaire (other)

| Person-Organization-Fit | Job Satisfaction | Community Citizenship Behaviour |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ My values match or fit the values of my organization. ▪ My goals are very similar to the goals of my organization. ▪ My values match those of current employees in this organization. ▪ Overall, I think I fit well with my organization.³⁶ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Most days I am enthusiastic about my work.³⁷ ▪ I feel fairly satisfied with my present job.³⁸ ▪ I find real enjoyment in my work.³⁹ ▪ I am happy about employment conditions in my organisation.⁴⁰ ▪ Relationship with my colleagues is friendly and professional.⁴¹ ▪ I am rewarded and recognised when I do well.⁴² | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I am involved in community service and volunteer activities outside of work. ▪ I believe it is important to give back to the community. ▪ I take into consideration the effects of decisions I make in my job on the overall community. ▪ When possible, I try and get my organization involved in community projects that I am involved in. ▪ I believe than an organization is obligated to serve the community in which it operates.⁴³ |

Table 4: Items included in the country specific section of questionnaire (Pakistan)

| Pakistan specific survey items (based on focus group and project team comments) | |
|---|--|
| 1. | I joined public service for a chance to acquire authority and influence on important issues. |
| 2. | I joined public service for a stable, secure and promising future. |
| 3. | I joined public service for high prestige and social status. |
| 4. | I joined public service to build a strong network of connections. |
| 5. | I joined public service to increase my opportunities for earning income. |
| 6. | I joined public service to learn new things. |
| 7. | Entering the public service was a highly competitive procedure. |
| 8. | Entering the public service was a highly transparent procedure. |
| 9. | Given the opportunity, I would leave my current job to take a job in a different sector. |
| 10. | My salary is enough to live on. |
| 11. | My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. |
| 12. | There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. |
| 13. | There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. |
| 14. | When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. |

Table 5: Items included in the country specific section of questionnaire (Kazakhstan)

| Kazakhstan specific survey items (based on focus group and project team comments) | |
|---|---|
| 1. | I joined public service to increase my opportunities for earning income. |
| 2. | I joined public service to build a strong network of connections. |
| 3. | I joined public service for a chance to make a contribution to important decisions. |
| 4. | I joined public service for high prestige and social status. |
| 5. | I joined public service for a chance to learn new things. |
| 6. | I joined public service for a stable and promising future. |
| 7. | There are sufficient opportunities for promotion. |
| 8. | There are regular opportunities for professional development at my job. |
| 9. | When I come to work, I know what is expected of me. |
| 10. | My salary package is fair and corresponds with my responsibilities and efforts. |

Table 6: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: gender

| Motivational Types | FEMALE | | | MALE | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.167 | 3.884 | 0.007** | 4.175 | 3.994 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.161 | 4.164 | 0.980 | 4.278 | 4.303 | 0.612 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.166 | 3.970 | 0.029 | 4.174 | 4.093 | 0.130 |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.204 | 3.926 | 0.007** | 4.123 | 3.872 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.037 | 3.476 | 0.000*** | 4.112 | 3.709 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.505 | 3.704 | 0.158 | 3.463 | 3.765 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.441 | 4.096 | 0.007** | 4.144 | 4.118 | 0.727 |
| Job satisfaction | 4.152 | 3.608 | 0.000*** | 3.882 | 3.619 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.885 | 3.594 | 0.005** | 3.698 | 3.677 | 0.743 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.280 | 4.222 | 0.000*** | 3.207 | 4.357 | 0.000*** |

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Table 7: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: educational level

| Motivational Types | VOCATIONAL AND BACHELOR | | | MASTER | | |
|--|-------------------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.186 | 3.908 | 0.000*** | 4.190 | 3.928 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.261 | 4.221 | 0.551 | 4.289 | 4.302 | 0.869 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.187 | 4.002 | 0.020 | 4.174 | 3.956 | 0.005** |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.154 | 3.872 | 0.001** | 4.136 | 3.982 | 0.041* |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.131 | 3.537 | 0.000*** | 4.093 | 3.474 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.520 | 3.708 | 0.072 | 3.414 | 3.888 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.250 | 4.067 | 0.069 | 4.190 | 4.160 | 0.794 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.990 | 3.607 | 0.000*** | 3.873 | 3.508 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.834 | 3.626 | 0.052 | 3.668 | 3.676 | 0.922 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.250 | 4.267 | 0.000*** | 3.216 | 4.280 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 8: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: age

| Motivational Types | 39 AND UNDER | | | 40 AND ABOVE | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.176 | 3.918 | 0.000*** | 4.169 | 3.960 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.268 | 4.219 | 0.375 | 4.250 | 4.232 | 0.799 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.184 | 4.020 | 0.008 | 4.164 | 4.027 | 0.026* |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.129 | 3.876 | 0.000*** | 4.140 | 3.965 | 0.014* |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.092 | 3.557 | 0.000*** | 4.117 | 3.616 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.541 | 3.747 | 0.013 | 3.394 | 3.695 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.242 | 4.100 | 0.083 | 4.148 | 4.115 | 0.692 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.956 | 3.562 | 0.000*** | 3.883 | 3.731 | 0.028* |
| Person-organization fit | 3.767 | 3.587 | 0.007** | 3.701 | 3.726 | 0.762 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.247 | 3.259 | 0.000*** | 3.193 | 4.326 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 9: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: *level of experience*

| Motivational Types | JUNIOR | | | SENIOR | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.098 | 3.946 | 0.008** | 4.192 | 3.912 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.183 | 4.229 | 0.510 | 4.282 | 4.215 | 0.265 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.123 | 4.059 | 0.340 | 4.176 | 3.977 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.042 | 3.885 | 0.016* | 4.135 | 3.926 | 0.001** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.010 | 3.437 | 0.000*** | 4.133 | 3.531 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.544 | 3.742 | 0.036 | 3.444 | 3.717 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.186 | 4.134 | 0.580 | 4.141 | 4.069 | 0.371 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.880 | 3.597 | 0.000*** | 3.921 | 3.632 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.739 | 3.599 | 0.116 | 3.695 | 3.666 | 0.675 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.200 | 4.288 | 0.000*** | 3.203 | 4.268 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Table 10: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: *supervisory responsibilities*

| Motivational Types | NO | | | YES | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.202 | 3.914 | 0.000*** | 4.139 | 3.971 | 0.001*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.319 | 4.203 | 0.116 | 4.216 | 4.273 | 0.311 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.143 | 4.012 | 0.156 | 4.167 | 4.048 | 0.031* |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.203 | 3.902 | 0.001** | 4.079 | 3.906 | 0.004** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.113 | 3.541 | 0.000*** | 4.064 | 3.659 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.714 | 3.752 | 0.721 | 3.358 | 3.679 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.381 | 4.068 | 0.003** | 4.085 | 4.197 | 0.163 |
| Job satisfaction | 4.061 | 3.572 | 0.000*** | 3.838 | 3.716 | 0.035* |
| Person-organization fit | 3.947 | 3.577 | 0.000*** | 3.636 | 3.759 | 0.064 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.357 | 4.263 | 0.000*** | 3.155 | 4.319 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

Table 11: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: *government level*

| Motivational Types | LOCAL | | | CENTRAL | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.193 | 3.914 | 0.000*** | 4.039 | 3.967 | 0.407 |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.284 | 4.196 | 0.076 | 4.101 | 4.285 | 0.050 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.198 | 4.005 | 0.000*** | 3.983 | 4.060 | 0.498 |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.138 | 3.921 | 0.000*** | 4.048 | 3.921 | 0.276 |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.121 | 3.562 | 0.000*** | 3.968 | 3.604 | 0.003** |
| Extrinsic | 3.468 | 3.677 | 0.000*** | 3.531 | 3.852 | 0.023* |
| Intrinsic | 4.207 | 4.091 | 0.073 | 4.032 | 4.135 | 0.493 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.959 | 3.604 | 0.000*** | 3.716 | 3.633 | 0.477 |
| Person-organization fit | 3.776 | 3.605 | 0.002** | 3.580 | 3.684 | 0.370 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.232 | 4.270 | 0.000*** | 3.109 | 4.300 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 12a: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: *job function*

| Motivational Types | POLICY PLANNING | | | POLICY IMPLEMENTATION | | |
|--|-----------------|--------------|----------|-----------------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.122 | 3.870 | 0.014* | 4.354 | 3.937 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.208 | 4.148 | 0.580 | 4.447 | 4.260 | 0.029* |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.072 | 3.956 | 0.274 | 4.309 | 4.029 | 0.002** |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.147 | 3.876 | 0.051 | 4.351 | 3.886 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.000 | 3.498 | 0.000*** | 4.264 | 3.574 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.362 | 3.873 | 0.008** | 3.583 | 3.699 | 0.260 |
| Intrinsic | 4.166 | 3.975 | 0.344 | 4.157 | 4.141 | 0.893 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.566 | 3.680 | 0.580 | 4.147 | 3.590 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.540 | 3.540 | 0.704 | 3.624 | 3.624 | 0.000*** |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.250 | 4.160 | 0.000*** | 3.439 | 4.323 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, **= $p < .01$, ***= $p < .001$

Table 12b: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: *job function*

| Motivational Types | REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT | | | ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGEMENT | | |
|--|--------------------------|--------------|----------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.071 | 3.935 | 0.423 | 4.097 | 3.929 | 0.002** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.250 | 4.219 | 0.872 | 4.157 | 4.225 | 0.294 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.055 | 4.032 | 0.897 | 4.133 | 4.013 | 0.063 |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.138 | 3.869 | 0.028* | 4.040 | 3.939 | 0.132 |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.125 | 3.621 | 0.021* | 4.028 | 3.539 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.966 | 3.757 | 0.100 | 4.059 | 3.727 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.222 | 4.186 | 0.872 | 4.132 | 4.020 | 0.216 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.844 | 3.680 | 0.404 | 3.864 | 3.590 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.662 | 3.662 | 0.290 | 3.655 | 3.655 | 0.764 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.027 | 4.296 | 0.000*** | 3.144 | 4.252 | 0.000*** |

| Motivational Types | YES | | | NO | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.155 | 3.954 | 0.000*** | 4.177 | 3.911 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.285 | 4.296 | 0.845 | 4.231 | 4.161 | 0.268 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.123 | 4.033 | 0.165 | 4.206 | 4.013 | 0.001** |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.073 | 3.931 | 0.033* | 4.159 | 3.880 | 0.000*** |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.060 | 3.556 | 0.000*** | 4.123 | 3.591 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.656 | 3.780 | 0.076 | 3.302 | 3.690 | 0.000*** |
| Intrinsic | 4.282 | 4.094 | 0.037 | 3.964 | 4.114 | 0.928 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.870 | 3.607 | 0.000*** | 3.964 | 3.618 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.766 | 3.640 | 0.084 | 3.701 | 3.620 | 0.292 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.255 | 4.300 | 0.000*** | 3.182 | 4.262 | 0.000*** |

Table 13: Comparative differences in Motivational Types between sub groups: previous NGO/private sector experience

| Motivational Types | YES | | | NO | | |
|--|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test | Pakistan | Kazakhstan | T-test |
| PSM | 4.205 | 3.898 | 0.000*** | 4.104 | 3.946 | 0.005** |
| <i>Attraction to Policy Making</i> | 4.344 | 4.196 | 0.014* | 4.118 | 4.235 | 0.058 |
| <i>Commitment to Public Interest</i> | 4.194 | 3.945 | 0.000*** | 4.126 | 4.059 | 0.273 |
| <i>Compassion</i> | 4.160 | 3.936 | 0.001** | 4.057 | 3.888 | 0.018* |
| <i>Self-Sacrifice</i> | 4.097 | 3.513 | 0.000*** | 4.090 | 3.604 | 0.000*** |
| Extrinsic | 3.481 | 3.790 | 0.000*** | 3.444 | 3.703 | 0.001** |
| Intrinsic | 4.295 | 4.042 | 0.006** | 4.051 | 4.135 | 0.322 |
| Job satisfaction | 3.813 | 3.413 | 0.000*** | 4.105 | 3.707 | 0.000*** |
| Person-organization fit | 3.699 | 3.498 | 0.008** | 3.800 | 3.691 | 0.210 |
| Community citizenship behaviour | 3.271 | 4.246 | 0.006** | 3.129 | 4.295 | 0.000*** |

*= $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < .001$

8. NOTES

- 1 Liu and Perry (2016).
- 2 Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise (2010).
- 3 Perry and Wise (1990: 368).
- 4 Hood (1991); Osborne and Gaebler (1992).
- 5 See Frederickson and Smith (2003); Tullock (1976).
- 6 Perry, Wise, and Hondeghem (2010); Ritz et al. (2016); Van der Wal (2013); Van der Wal (2015a).
- 7 Van der Wal and Oosterbaan (2013); Van der Wal (2015b).
- 8 Taylor, 2008
- 9 Baston and Shaw, 1991; Weinstein and Ryan, 2010
- 10 Perry 2014; Liu and Perry 2016.
- 11 Van der Wal, 2015
- 12 Bozeman and Su, 2015
- 13 Kim et al. (2013); Van der Wal (2015a, 2015b).
- 14 Chen and Hsieh (2014); Infeld et al. (2009); Liu and Tang (2011).
- 15 Infeld et al. (2009, 2010, 2011).
- 16 Fan (2007); Taylor and Beh (2013); Van der Wal (2015a, 2015b); Xu (2006).
- 17 Deci, Connell, and Ryan (1989).
- 18 See also recent work by Pandey and Jain (2014).
- 19 Liu and Tang (2011).
- 20 Ritz, 2015; Van der Wal, 2013; Rayner, Williams, Lawton and Allinson, 2011
- 21 UNDP (2015); Ritz et al. (2016); Van der Wal (2014, 2015a).
- 22 Rowe and Wright (1999).
- 23 Creswell (2003); Morgan (1997).
- 24 cf. Perry and Hondeghem (2008: 3).
- 25 Chen and Chen (2013); Chen and Hsieh (2014); Kim et al. (2013); Liu and Perry (2014); Van der Wal (2015a).
- 26 Perry (1996: 6-7); Kim et al. (2013); Kim and Vandenabeele (2010).
- 27 Behn (2014); De Bruijn (2012).
- 28 See e.g., Kim et al. (2013).
- 29 Liu and Perry, 2016
- 30 Liu and Perry, 2016
- 31 Liu and Perry, 2016; Hsu and Sun, 2014
- 32 Liu and Perry, 2016; Liu et al, 2014

- 33 Mafini and Dlodlo, 2014
- 34 Chen and Hsieh, 2014
- 35 Kwon, 2012
- 36 Gould-Williams et al. 2013.
- 37 Kim, 2012.
- 38 Kim, 2012.
- 39 Kim, 2012.
- 40 Mafini and Dlodlo, 2014.
- 41 Mafini and Dlodlo, 2014.
- 42 Mafini and Dlodlo, 2014.
- 43 Liu and Perry, 2016.

The Astana Civil Service Hub, an initiative of the Government of Kazakhstan and the United Nations Development Programme, was established in March 2013 by 25 countries and 5 international organisations. It receives financial and institutional support from the Government of Kazakhstan and it relishes the backing of UNDP as the key implementing partner.

The ACSH is a multilateral institutional platform for the continuous exchange of knowledge and experience in the field of civil service development, aiming at supporting governments in the region through fostering partnerships, capacity building and peer-to-peer learning development activities, and evidence-based solutions, informed by a comprehensive research agenda. The geographical range of participants stretches from North America and Europe through CIS, Caucasus and Central Asia to ASEAN countries, demonstrating that partnership for civil service excellence is a constant and universal need for all nations.